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signals about future monetary policy. Based on a new daily data set, this
paper examines the reactions of foreign exchange markets, domestic stock
market indices and sovereign bond spreads to central bank governor changes.
The data cover 20 emerging markets over the period 1992-2006. We ﬁnd that
the replacement of a central bank governor negatively aﬀects ﬁnancial markets
on the announcement day. This negative eﬀect is mainly driven by irregular
changes, i.e., changes occurring before the scheduled end of tenure, sending
negative signals about perceived central bank independence. Personal charac-
teristics of the central banker, to the contrary, are less important for market
reactions. We ﬁnd no evidence that changes in the central banker’s conser-
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11 Introduction
"After arguing behind the scenes with his central bank governor
over the direction of interest rates, Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra of Thailand [..] dismissed the banker [..] brought a
sharp reaction of ﬁnancial markets, where it cast doubts over
the political independence of the Thai central bank." 1
The dynamic inconsistency of low-inﬂation monetary policy can be overcome
by delegating monetary policy to independent and conservative central bankers
(Rogoﬀ, 1985). While many countries have recently granted their central banks legal
independence, the experience of some countries suggests limited actual indepen-
dence, with the head of the central bank frequently being replaced at short notice
and outside the legal schedule. How do ﬁnancial markets react to changes at the head
of the central bank?2 We expect them to react to such changes if changes convey
new information about expected future monetary policy. Economic theory suggests
that the inﬂationary bias is determined by the degree of central bank indepen-
dence and the degree of the bank’s conservativeness.3 Hence, if market participants’
perceptions change with respect to one of these two dimensions, we will expect a
change in asset prices to the extent that these prices are sensitive to inﬂation. There
are two transmission channels: First, when the government interfered in the replace-
ment procedure, irregular turnovers are likely to aﬀect markets’ perceptions about
the central bank’s independence. Second, if the perceived inﬂation aversion of the
new head of the central bank diﬀers from its predecessor’s, this will alter expected
ﬁnancial market returns.
The importance of who is member of the central bank council for economic out-
comes has been demonstrated in the previous literature. For example, Göhlmann
and Vaubel (2007) show that education and profession of the central bank’s govern-
1New York Times (2001).
2We call the heads of the central bank "governors" independent of whether their actual job title
is governor, director or president.
3Eijﬃnger and Hoeberichts (1998) and Berger et al. (2001) explicitly model the two dimensions.
Berger et al. (2001) also oﬀer an excellent review of research on central bank independence. For a
critique on Rogoﬀ’s delegation mechanism, see for instance McCallum (1995). Piga (2000) oﬀers
an overview of this strand of the literature.
2ing council members matter for the eﬀectiveness in controlling inﬂation. Drawing
on a sample of industrialized countries Kuttner and Posen (2007) conclude that
markets do care about who chairs the central bank. Central bank governor changes
apparently incorporate new information about the future course of monetary pol-
icy, thereby aﬀecting exchange rates and domestic bond yields. Kuttner and Posen
(2007) do not ﬁnd evidence of a generic credibility problem, i.e., a systematic (at
least) transitory increase in inﬂation expectations at the beginning of a central
bank governors’ tenure. However, Kuttner and Posen (2007) conﬁne their analysis
to advanced markets. In these markets, central bank governor turnovers are mostly
predictable, and highly developed institutions are likely to reduce the individual
governor’s inﬂuence. To the contrary, appointments of central bank governors are
among the most sensitive decisions for emerging market governments, as these poli-
cymakers play a crucial role in communicating with international markets (Santiso,
2003). Whether and to what extent eﬀects similar to those observed for advanced
markets exist for emerging markets has so far not been investigated. Given the ex-
treme market reactions to changes in who is the head of the central bank in some
emerging markets, this gap in the literature is quite surprising. 4
This paper examines the impact of central bank governor changes on domestic
and international ﬁnancial markets in emerging economies. Based on a new daily
data set including 20 emerging markets over the period 1992-2006, we pursue four
speciﬁc objectives: First, we examine how foreign exchange rates, domestic stock
market indices and sovereign bond spreads react to the announcement of a change
at the helm of an emerging market central bank. Second, we test whether irregular
changes aﬀect the markets diﬀerently as compared to regular ones. Third, we oﬀer
proxies for perceived central bank independence and perceived conservativeness in
order to gauge their relative impact on asset prices via changes of the inﬂationary
bias. Finally, we test whether and to what extent central bank governor’s personal
characteristics aﬀect market reactions.
4For instance, ﬁnancial markets reacted sharply in Argentina (2002), when the well-respected
central bank governor Mario Blejer resigned after growing policy diﬀerences between the central
bank and the ministry of economy led by Roberto Lavagna.
3To anticipate our main results, the replacement of a central bank governor af-
fects ﬁnancial markets on the announcement day negatively. Speciﬁcally, exchange
rates depreciate. The picture on domestic stock markets and foreign-currency de-
nominated bond yields is - not surprisingly - more mixed, since these markets are at
most indirectly exposed to inﬂation risk. According to our results, the negative eﬀect
on ﬁnancial markets is mainly driven by central bank governor changes that occur
before the oﬃcially scheduled end of their tenure. While ﬁnancial markets seem to
react to perceived changes in central bank independence, personal characteristics of
the central banker are less important for market reactions. The degree of central
bankers’ conservatism does not matter for market reactions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 derives our hy-
potheses, while Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 discusses the methodology
used; Section 5 shows our results. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Hypotheses
Evidence on the impact of who is in charge of economic policies on economic out-
comes is scarce. Only very recently selected studies started analyzing the issue.
Among them, Besley et al. (2005) use household survey data from India and ﬁnd
that diﬀerences in the performance of Indian village politicians are systematically
linked to individual politicians’ education. Jones and Olken (2005) ﬁnd that the
impact of who is the head of a government matters for economic growth. Similarly,
Dreher et al. (2006) show the educational and professional background of a head of
government to be decisive for the implementation of reforms. According to Moser
(2006), changing the ﬁnance or economics minister increases bond spreads among a
sample of twelve Latin American countries over the period 1992-2005.
Turning to central banks, Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) provide recent empirical
evidence. Their results show that education and profession of the central bank’s gov-
erning council members matter for the eﬀectiveness in controlling inﬂation. In a re-
lated study, Adolph (2004) documents that personal career ambitions aﬀect the per-
4formance of central bankers. According to Gürkaynak et al. (2005), certain kinds of
policy changes could aﬀect market participants’ inferences about the central bank’s
policy objectives. Kuttner and Posen (2007) ﬁnd that markets care about who chairs
the central bank. According to their results for 15 advanced economies, changing a
central bank governor conveys signals about the future course of monetary policy,
thereby aﬀecting exchange rates and ﬁnancial market returns. We expect the same
to hold for our sample of emerging market countries. We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: Investors react to central bank governor changes.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) show in their semi-
nal papers that policymakers can not credibly commit themselves to low-inﬂation
policy. One approach to overcome this time-inconsistency problem is to establish
reputation (see for instance Backus and Driﬃll, 1985; Barro, 1996). While the pub-
lic may not know the central bankers’ preferences, policymakers’ behaviour conveys
some information about their characteristics and the public will adapt their expec-
tations about inﬂation accordingly. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) emphasize the
importance of uncertainty about the underlying preferences of the governor. A less
conservative governor ("dovish") has an incentive to mimic the behaviour of the
more conservative one ("hawkish") for a while, but sooner or later it becomes opti-
mal to behave opportunistically. Uncertainty can be expected to be highest at the
beginning of a governor’s tenure. In a similar vein, Schaumburg and Tambalotti
(2007) and Kara (2007) state that newly-appointed central bank governors suﬀer
from a systematic credibility problem. While the incumbent governors can credibly
commit to policy during their own administration, their successors might deviate
and pursue discretionary policies.
Hypothesis 1b: Investors react negatively to central bank governor changes
due to a systematic credibility problem at the start of new governors’ tenure.
Rogoﬀ (1985) proposes another approach to remedy the inconsistency problem,
namely the delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central bank. Eijﬃn-
ger and Hoeberichts (1998) and Berger et al. (2001) develop an argument in spirit
5of Rogoﬀ (1985). The government seeks to minimize the following loss function,














where ¼t is the rate of inﬂation at day t, yt is output, y¤ denotes desired output and
Â is the government’s weight on output stabilization (Â > 0). In contrast to that,














where ² denotes the additional inﬂation aversion of the central bank governor. Fur-
thermore, Eijﬃnger and Hoeberichts (1998) argue that central bankers’ preferences
only matter to the extent that they can pursue monetary policy without (much)
government interference. This can be captured in the following way:
Mt = °L
CB + (1 ¡ °)L
Gov;
where ° and Mt denote the degree of central bank independence and monetary pol-
icy, respectively. Assuming that output is determined by a simpliﬁed Lucas supply













1 + °² + Â
¹t:
The equation on the left (right) side represents the inﬂation outcome without (with)
delegation of monetary policy. Comparing these two outcomes, it becomes clear that
it is the product of central bank independence and conservativeness that matters
for monetary policy. We will label this product "eﬀective conservatism" of mon-
etary policy. For positive values of ° and ² any increase of either the degree of
central bank independence or the central bank governor’s conservativeness will ce-
teris paribus decrease the inﬂationary bias. Figure 1 graphically shows that the same
level of monetary policy can be achieved through various combinations of the two
dimensions.
6Figure 1: Eﬀective Conservatism
Following this line of argumentation, changing the central bank governor might
impact ﬁnancial market expectations (at least) along these two dimensions. First,
changes at the head of the central bank may carry signals about the future stance
of the incumbent government on the central bank’s independence. If the central
bank governors’ resignation is politically motivated and/or the incoming governors
lack political independence, ﬁnancial markets are likely to react negatively. Second,
a newly appointed central bank governors’ attitude towards conservative monetary
policy might deviate from those of his predecessor. Depending on whether markets
expect the new incumbent to be more ﬁnancially conservative than the old one,
market reactions should be positive. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2a: Investors react to changes in perceived conservatism.
And in particular:
Hypothesis 2b: Investors react negatively to irregular changes, as a decrease
in perceived central bank independence decreases eﬀective conservatism.
We employ various characteristics of outgoing and newly appointed governors to dis-
tinguish between these two channels. Furthermore, the extent to which international
7investors react to central bank governor changes may depend on the institutional
setting of the central bank. More speciﬁcally, the independence of a highly indepen-
dent central bank might not be perceived to be in danger after irregular changes. On
the other hand, in these countries, in particular, political interference in the turnover
of a government will trigger substantial response, as such interference arguably has
a bigger impact on perceptions about the bank’s independence. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3: Investors’ reactions to central bank governor changes depend
on the institution’s legal framework.
Turning to appointments of new governors, we distinguish between incoming gov-
ernors educated in the US or UK and those without such education. On average,
we expect US- or UK-educated governors to be perceived as more conservative and
credible than those without such education, since investors can better anticipate
their preferences.5 We also separately analyze incoming governors with a history
in their central bank (insiders) and those without (outsiders). Adolph (2004) ﬁnds
that ﬁnancial sector and ﬁnance ministry veterans are associated with lower inﬂation
than other government bureaucrats and central bank staﬀ.
Hypothesis 4: Markets react to personal characteristics of the incoming
central bank governor.
Finally, we separately analyze anticipated and unanticipated resignations, since we
would expect that the surprise content and consequently the market reaction is more
pronounced for unanticipated events:
Hypothesis 5: Unanticipated resignations lead to larger market reactions
than anticipated ones.
Clearly, governor changes might aﬀect exchange markets, stock markets and bond
markets to a diﬀerent degree - and even in diﬀerent directions. We address each of
5A similar argument is put forward by Santiso (2003).
8these markets in turn. We implicitly assume that the semi-strong form of the eﬃ-
cient market hypothesis holds.6 Under this hypothesis security prices are assumed
to reﬂect all public information and to adjust swiftly to the arrival of new public
information. In this vein, a central bank governor change is expected to aﬀect asset
prices, if and only if, the change contains new information about the future course
of monetary policy. If markets fully anticipate the event or an information leakage
occurs, prices will not react at all. The underlying null hypothesis for all our hy-
potheses is thus that central bank governor changes do not contain any relevant
news about the future monetary policy course.
Foreign Exchange Markets
Following Kuttner and Posen (2007) our starting point for analyzing the impact of





with e being the log of the foreign exchange rate (foreign currency/domestic cur-
rency), i being the domestic interest rate, and where i¤ is the foreign interest rate.









where eT, the nominal exchange rate at some future date T, can be thought of as
the expected equilibrium exchange rate, determined by - for large enough values of
T - purchasing power parity (PPP). Hence, expected changes in monetary policy
can aﬀect the foreign exchange rate either through expected changes in the nominal
interest rate diﬀerentials and/or changes in the expected long-run exchange rate.
For positive (negative) changes in eﬀective conservatism, i.e. either an increase in
central bank independence or conservatism, we will expect the foreign exchange rate
to appreciate (depreciate). This can materialize either through a rise in the interest
rate diﬀerential and/or by reducing the expected future price level.
6Even though empirical evidence is still ambiguous, the semi-strong form of eﬃcient market
hypothesis enjoys wide acceptance.
9Domestic Stock Markets
The eﬀect of a change in the expected monetary policy on stock markets is less
obvious than for the exchange markets. Stock market prices can be valuated in the
context of present-value models. Following Campbell et al. (1997) the stock price
can be expressed as the expected value of future dividends (D) out to the inﬁnite












For this classic "Gordon growth model," changing monetary policy expectations
can potentially aﬀect stock prices through two diﬀerent channels. Policy expecta-
tions might simply aﬀect the discount rate or more subtly aﬀect the expected future
dividend stream. While the expected coeﬃcient for a decrease in eﬀective conser-
vatism might be rather positive than negative, Fama (1981) and Schwert (1981), for
instance, ﬁnd a negative relation between inﬂation and stock returns. Alternatively,
one could bear analogy to Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), who argue that a
perceived worsening of an incumbent government’s (ﬁscal) responsibility may lower
the valuation of the country’s asset in an environment of limited ﬁnancial depth. To
sum up, while based on a pure inﬂation argument the expected stock market eﬀects
to a central bank governor change are ambiguous, on a more general ground, ﬁnancial
investors may demand a higher risk premium for perceived bad policy management.
Foreign-currency Denominated Bond Markets
The classical approach to model sovereign bond yields dates back to Edwards (1984),







Since our bond data is restricted to foreign-currency denominated public or pub-
licly guaranteed debt, the default risk is concerned with the risk that a government
defaults on or not fully honours its bond contracts to foreigners (Obstfeld and Ro-
goﬀ, 1996). News aﬀecting the sovereign’s default probability is expected to alter
10sovereign bond spreads.7 Foreign-currency denominated bonds are not sensitive to
changing inﬂation expectations and any possible transmission channel is of indirect
nature via the changing perception of the probability of default.8 Alternatively, one
can argue once more in line with Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004). If investors
dislike the way the central bank governor change is induced, for instance due to polit-
ical interference in an otherwise independent central bank, bond prices are expected
to fall.
3 Data
Our analysis is based on several types of data. The selection of countries is con-
strained by the availability of ﬁnancial market data on a daily basis. We focus
on countries where reliable foreign exchange market, stock market and bond mar-
ket data is available. The resulting sample spans the period 1992 to 2006 for the
following 20 emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt,
Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia,
South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela. The number of obser-
vations varies, however, among our estimation samples.
A major pillar of our daily dataset is the unique sample on changes of central
bank governors. We have drawn on various sources. The bulk of our data is derived
from full-text analysis on the Economist, the Wall Street Journal and the Financial
Times through the online data base provider LexisNexis. As Santiso (2003) points
out, these newspapers are unchallenged in the ﬁnancial community and contribute
to shaping public attention and categories of thought. "[..] for professionals working
7More precisely, adverse news on the country’s creditworthiness leads to a decline in bond prices
and hence an increase in yields-to-maturity and bond spreads, respectively.
8We can think of two diﬀerent channels how central bank governor changes impact the perceived
probability of default. First, if the change at the head of the central bank is interpreted as a sign
of political interference, international investors will be expected to demand a higher sovereign
spread. A less independent central banker (for any given level of conservatism) makes it more
likely that ﬁscal policy ultimately dominates monetary policy, driving up public debt and the
perceived probability of default. Second, a more conservative response to excess inﬂation raises
(for given level of independence) expected real interest rates, reducing expected investment and,
hence, expected growth rates. This in turn will worsen the debt sustainability situation, which is
expected to increase the probability of default and, hence, the sovereign bond spread.
11in emerging markets, the Financial Times is considered the major source of informa-
tion" (Santiso, 2003, p. 129). These three ﬁnancial newspaper sources are backed by
other press sources available through LexisNexis, if necessary. Overall, this proce-
dure yields 65 observations, comprising 44 resignations and 21 appointments at the
head of a central bank. Appendix 1 shows the number of observations per country
in our data set, with Argentina and Brazil by far showing the greatest number of
turnovers over the sample period.9
We also collected data on additional characteristics of the central bank governors
in our sample. Moreover, we have cautiously sought to infer from newspaper arti-
cles whether and to what extent the respective change has been anticipated. If the
change was largely anticipated by the markets, we would expect a softer reaction
in bond spreads. Regarding appointments, we distinguish between insiders and out-
siders. While the former have shown at least some central bank experience before
being designated as central bank governor, the latter have not. We also gathered
information on whether the respective governor has been educated in the US or UK.
While we can be conﬁdent about the hard facts, i.e., the name and position of the
governor and his date of departure, the soft facts about the surprise content should
be interpreted more cautiously. The governor characteristics are completed with
data on the partisanship of the nominating government, drawn from the Database
of Political Institutions (see Beck et al., 2001). Appendix 4 gives a precise listing of
the timing and nature of central bank governor changes among our sample. A brief
summary for the reasons leaving the central bank is also given.
Regarding sovereign bond spread, we rely on index data provided by the U.S.
investment bank J.P. Morgan. These country indices are closely watched indicators
for perceived country risk in emerging markets. The yield spread or bond spread
can be interpreted as a default premium charged by investors above the risk-free
interest rate. It is expressed in basis points and is calculated as the yield diﬀerence
between the (basket of country) emerging market bond(s) and a comparable U.S.
bond. Speciﬁcally, we use the Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI), the Emerg-
9To foreshadow the empirical results, neither the exclusion of Brazil nor Argentina changes the
results qualitatively.
12ing Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) and the Emerging Markets Bond Global
(EMBIG).10 These sovereign bond spread indices are weighted averages of external-
currency-denominated individual bonds issued by a particular country. Spreads on
emerging market bonds most likely represent a mixture of spreads stemming from
credit risk and liquidity risk. Only sovereign bonds that comply with well-deﬁned
liquidity requirements are eligible for J.P. Morgan’s bond indices.11 As Sy (2001)
notes, the spreads have consequently little or similar liquidity risk premia. For this
reason we can assume that the impact of liquidity risk on the total country risk
premium is negligible.12 Appendix 2 gives an exact listing of the data available.
Appendix 3 provides summary statistics on the respective dependent and control
variables.
Turning to stock markets, we use local market indices provided by Morgan Stan-
ley Capital International Inc. (MSCI). The MSCI data used here are daily returns
of indices, excluding dividends, and measured in local currency. The indices mea-
sure market performance for selected securities, capturing the market capitalization
weighted return of all constituents included. For most countries among our sample,
data are available from January 1988 to December 2006.13
Regarding exchange rate data, ﬁnally, we draw from Bloomberg. Daily foreign
exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar are employed, whereby an increasing foreign
exchange indicator means a depreciation of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the U.S.
dollar.
We also employ a number of control variables. We control for US ﬁnancial market
indicators using the yield of 10-year US Treasury bonds and 3-month US Treasury
bills. Both variables are widely used to control for international liquidity. Finally, we
10Henceforth, the notion EMBI is used synonymously for EMBI, EMBI+ and EMBIG. We mainly
rely on the EMBI+ due to its relatively large coverage in Latin America, its liquidity requirements
and its up to date record. Bond spread data from the early 1990s are obtained from EMBI. For
Chile, Dominican Republic and Uruguay only EMBIG data is available.
11Instruments in the EMBI+ have to exceed the issue amount of USD 500 millions and must be
available and liquid. The average bid/oﬀer spread has to be smaller than 1.5 basis points.
12Strictly speaking, the interest rate (in local currency) is equal to the risk free rate (in "hard"
currency) plus the total country (risk) premium. The latter consists of the currency (risk) premium,
the pure default (risk) premium and the jurisdiction premium (see for instance Peter (2005).
13Note that MSCI returns are closely correlated with the returns of the respective country indices
(Pantzalis et al. 2000).
13add the volatility index (VIX) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) as a
proxy for ﬁnancial market uncertainty. The VIX measures the implied volatility from
option contracts on the Standard and Poor’s 100 (S&P 100) index. First suggested
by Duecker (1999), this index gives an idea about the market expectation of the
volatility of the S&P 100 in the subsequent month. In this sense, the index can be
interpreted as a forward looking indicator on global risk aversion.14
4 Method
To test the eﬀects of central bank governor changes on ﬁnancial markets we employ
three diﬀerent dependent variables. We gauge the eﬀect of the announcement of the
departure of the central bank governor on sovereign bond spreads, stock market
indices and the foreign exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.15
We start with three simple tests. First, we evaluate whether the mean change of
our variables of interest (¢y) over the sample period equals their mean change on
the event days. Our second test follows Kuttner and Posen (2007) and also refers
to the average market reaction to news announcements. As the volatility of our
dependent variables varies over time and country, we normalize ¢y by subtracting
oﬀ the average change ¢y over the 90 days preceding the announcement and dividing
by its estimated standard deviation ¾ over the same period of time. The statistic
we use is thus zi ´ (¢yt ¡ ¢y)=¾.
Under the null hypothesis that news regarding the change of the central bank
governor contain no relevant information, ¢y follows the pre-announcement distribu-
tion with zero mean and unit variance (Kuttner and Posen, 2007). We test whether
the average change in our normalized dependent variables signiﬁcantly diﬀers from
zero on days where the replacement of a governor is announced. The average depen-
dent variables are approximately distributed as normal variables with variance 1/N,
with N being the number of events in our sample.
14The same index is used in a study on sovereign bond spread indices by the IMF (2001).
15The fact that we use daily data does not allow us to control for classical macroeconomic
determinants of bond spreads or foreign exchange rates, like for instance the gross domestic product
or exports.
14As Kuttner and Posen (2007) note, positive and negative reactions to new gover-
nors might cancel themselves out, biasing market reactions downward. As an alter-
native test, they therefore propose a method introduced by Fisher (1941), combining
independent hypotheses into a single test statistic. According to Fisher, -2 times the
log of a p-value follows the Â2
2 distribution, where the sum of Â2
2 distributed variables
follows the same distribution. Under the null hypothesis ¡2
PN
i¡1 lnpi is distributed
as Â2
2N, with pi being the p-values of the individual tests. As one major disadvantage
with this method, the result is very sensitive regarding outliers. Speciﬁcally, a low
overall p-value can be driven by just one signiﬁcant event, with a p-value close to
zero. Still, we apply this method as our third preliminary test. As a next step, we
provide panel data analysis. All regressions control for day-of-the-week eﬀects. Our
baseline regression (equation 1) is estimated by pooled OLS with robust standard
errors clustered at the country level16 and takes the following form:
¢Yi;t = ® + ¸¢Yi;t¡1 + ¯RESIGNi;t + °APPOINTi;t + ´¢Xi;t + ºwDw + ²i;t; (1)
where the subscripts i and t indicate country and time, respectively. Yi;t is the
respective dependent variable denoted in log-diﬀerences, namely the MSCI stock
market indices, the foreign exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and the EMBI
bond spreads. The dependent variable also enters the equation lagged by one period
- we return to this below. Our coeﬃcients of interest are ¯ and °, accounting for
the impact of resignations RESIGNi;t and new appointments APPOINTi;t at the
head of the central bank. The variable is one on the day of the change (t). The error
term ²i;t is assumed to be an independently distributed random variable with mean
zero and variance ¾2
i;t . We employ dummy variables Dw, running from Monday to
Thursday, in order to control for week-day-eﬀects.
The matrix Xi;t includes up to three of the following US ﬁnancial market in-
dicators available on a daily basis that might aﬀect emerging market ﬁnancial in-
dicators, namely the volatility index (VIX) and U.S. interest rates (10-year U.S.
16Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Andritzky et al. (2007) employ a similar empirical strat-
egy. We do not include ﬁxed country eﬀects as they are not jointly signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Our key results are not changed by their exclusion.
15Treasury bonds and 3-month U.S. T-bills). We employ log changes of the volatility
index, proxying for time varying risk appetite of international investors. We expect
a positive (negative) coeﬃcient for the volatility variable on bond spreads and for-
eign exchange rates (stock markets). Economic theory suggests a positive eﬀect of
U.S. interest rates on emerging market bond spreads. A rise in U.S. interest rates
increases the debt burden for an emerging market government and, hence, nega-
tively aﬀects the capacity to repay its debt.17 We thus control for the log-diﬀerence
of 10-year US Treasury yields and log changes of 3-month US T-bills. 18
Finally, one speciﬁc issue arises in the case of foreign exchange rates. By deﬁ-
nition, ﬁxed exchange rate regimes do not allow for daily market reactions in case
of the announcement of the central banker change. For this reason, we interact the
resignation or appointment variable with a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 in case of a ﬂexible exchange rate (or at least not fully pegged exchange rate) and
which is 0 otherwise.19
In a second step, we introduce an interaction term between the resignation dummy
and an event dummy for irregular central bank governor changes.
¢Yi;t = ® + ¸¢Yi;t¡1 + ¯1RESIGNi;t + ¯2RESIGNi;t ¤ IRREGi;t + (2)
+ °APPOINTi;t + ´¢Xi;t + ºwDw + ²i;t;
where IRREGi;t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if the central bank
governor change occurred before the expiration of the central bank governor tenure
and 0 otherwise. If investors’ reaction to irregular events is markedly diﬀerent from
the overall resignation eﬀect, we expect a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the interaction
term. Following Kuttner and Posen (2007), we also classify cases in which the incum-
bent governor was eligible for reappointment, but did not receive it, as irregular.20
We suggest that irregular central bank governor changes can be interpreted as a
17See Kamin and von Kleist (1999) and Arora and Cerisola (2001) for further discussion.
18Deﬁned as 100*log(1 + iUS
t ).
19Since common exchange rate classiﬁcations are not available on a daily basis, we simply label
an exchange rate regime as ﬂexible as long as at least some market reactions are observable in the
weeks around the event day.
20These kinds of irregular changes constitute a very small number of all irregular resignations.
16certain degree of political interference of the government in the central bank, since
most of them take place way before the scheduled expiration day.21 Hence, irregu-
lar events can be expected to alter perceived central bank independence, which is -
according to Eijﬃnger and Hoeberichts (1998) and Berger et al. (2001) - one of the
two key determinants of inﬂationary bias.
Third, we seek to control for the second important dimension of the inﬂationary
bias, namely the perceived inﬂation aversion of the new head of the central bank. If
the inﬂation preferences of the new central bank governor diﬀer from its predeces-
sor’s, this is expected to alter, ceteris paribus, ﬁnancial market returns. Obviously,
the inﬂation aversion of the new central bank governor is not observable on the
announcement day. Hence, we follow Berger, H. and U. Woitek (2005) and Adolph
(2004) in constructing our proxy. We use the partisan preferences of the government
nominating the central banker and assume a change in inﬂation aversion of the new
central bank governor, when the governor has been nominated by a diﬀerent govern-
ment than the previous one. Our deﬁnition of partisanship relies on the Database
of Political Institutions from the World Bank (see Beck et al., 2001). Our equation
changes to:
¢Yi;t = ® + ¸¢Yi;t¡1 + ¯1RESIGNi;t + ¯2RESIGNi;t ¤ IRREGi;t +
+ ¯3RESIGNi;t ¤ IRREGi;t ¤ PARTISANi;t + °APPOINTi;t + (3)
+ ´¢Xi;t + ºwDw + ²i;t;
where PARTISANi;t is a dummy variable that takes the value one when the nom-
inating government’s partisanship has changed from the previous one.
To investigate how far the level of central bank independence matters for market
reactions to the announcement of central bank governor changes in emerging mar-
kets we draw on work from Cukierman (1992) and Arnone et al. (2007). Building
on speciﬁcation (2) we estimate the average announcement eﬀect separately for two
21We abstain from distinguishing between "voluntary" and "forced" resignation before the end of
tenure as this information cannot be properly inferred from newspaper articles. In many instances
politicians and central bankers alike resign ostensibly "for personal reasons." But as a matter of
fact they would have been forced out of oﬃce otherwise. By resigning voluntarily, they are allowed
to save their face.
17sub samples, containing countries with below and above average legal central bank
independence over our sample period, respectively. The data on central bank inde-
pendence is available for two periods in time, the late 1980s and 2003. We use the
median of their average overall values over those periods.
Finally, we investigate whether and to what extent personal characteristics of central
bank governors matter for market reactions. We estimate
¢Yi;t = ® + ¸¢Yi;t¡1 + ¯RESIGNi;t + °APPOINTi;t ¤ CHARACTi;t + (4)
+ ´¢Xi;tºwDw + ²i;t
with CHARACTi;t representing dummies for the appointment of insiders or, respec-
tively, governors who have been educated in the UK or US.
As one potential caveat to this analysis, central bank governors might be dis-
missed as a consequence of economic crises, giving rise to endogeneity. When gov-
ernors are dismissed due to economic shocks, market reactions might reﬂect these
shocks rather than the exogenous change in who governs the central bank. While
this argument appears reasonable for quarterly or yearly data, endogeneity is un-
likely to be an issue when data frequency is daily, as is the case in our study. Even
if the governor is ﬁred as a consequence of macroeconomic crises, such crises usually
unfold over a longer period of time, so daily data can still be used to identify the
causal impact of the turnover itself on market reactions. Endogeneity is thus unlikely
to be an issue here.22
5 Results
Table 1 reports the average market reactions to the announcements of a change in
the central bank governor, the number of events, and the p-value associated with
the hypothesis that the event has no eﬀect on ﬁnancial markets.
As can be seen, the exchange rate and bond spreads do indeed react to resigna-
22True, the eﬀect of a turnover could diﬀer between crises and non crises periods. We do not
have daily crises data to investigate this hypothesis.
18Table 1: Mean change on event day vs. average
Exchange Bond Stock
Sample rate yield price LC
90 days avg. 0.002 -0.0002 0.001
All resignations Event day 0.010 0.007 -0.005
N 41 44 44
p-value 0.099 0.083 0.151
Irregular resignation Event day 0.014 0.008 -0.007
N 32 34 34
p-value 0.068 0.147 0.124
Regular resignation Event day -0.002 0.007 0.002
N 9 10 10
p-value 0.017 0.307 0.871
Anticipated resignation Event day -0.005 0.008 -0.001
N 7 7 7
p-value 0.052 0.308 0.778
Unanticipated resignation Event day 0.009 0.010 -0.004
N 13 16 16
p-value 0.515 0.037 0.602
90 days avg. 0.002 0.002 -0.001
All appointments Event day -0.007 -0.003 0.016
N 20 21 21
p-value 0.410 0.537 0.123
Appointment of insider Event day -0.014 0.000 0.007
N 8 9 9
p-value 0.582 0.400 0.437
Appointment of outsider Event day -0.004 -0.006 0.027
N 10 10 10
p-value 0.232 0.301 0.200
US based education Event day 0.003 -0.012 0.030
N 9 10 10
p-value 0.880 0.365 0.178
No US based education Event day -0.020 0.006 0.004
N 9 9 9
p-value 0.367 0.791 0.450
Note: The table evaluates whether the mean change of our variables of interest (¢y)
over the sample period equals their mean change on the event days.
19tions of central bank governors, with coeﬃcients signiﬁcant at the ten percent level.
Domestic stock prices, to the contrary, are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by resignations.
According to the results, the exchange rate depreciates, while bond spreads increase.
The table also shows that appointments of new governors do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the markets.
The further rows of Table 1 diﬀerentiate resignations and appointments accord-
ing to the various characteristics of the governors and events in our sample. Focusing
on irregular resignations (based on 32 observations), we do ﬁnd that the exchange
rate depreciates by more than 1 percent, on average, on the announcement day. To
the contrary, the exchange rate appreciates as a consequence of the nine regular res-
ignations among our sample. This might imply that incoming central bank governors
are on average perceived to be more conservative than their predecessors.
Comparing anticipated resignations with unanticipated ones, the results show no
obvious pattern. Clearly, anticipated events should already be priced in the markets,
according to the eﬃcient market hypothesis. Still, anticipated exits lead to an ap-
preciation of the exchange rate of 0.5 percent. This small - signiﬁcant - eﬀect might
stem from a perceived change in conservatism, since half of the anticipated events
are regular events that also involve a change in the partisanship of the nominating
government. Regarding bond spreads, the result is more in line with our a priori
expectations. Bond spreads increase by 1 percent following an unanticipated exit.
Table 2 shows the value of the z-statistics with their signiﬁcances. Again, the
results show some interesting patterns. Regarding the resignation of central bank
governors, the overall result is consistent with those reported in Table 1, with res-
ignations signiﬁcantly depreciating the exchange rate and increasing bond spreads.
Moreover, stock prices decrease, at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance. Again, the
results show that the eﬀect on the exchange rate is driven by irregular events, while
- this time - regular resignations increase bond spreads at the ten percent level of
signiﬁcance. Again, anticipated resignations lead to an appreciation of the exchange
rate with respect to the US Dollar, at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance. Also at
the ﬁve percent level, unanticipated exits increase bond spreads, while irregular ones
20Table 2: Average market reaction to events
Exchange Bond Stock
Sample rate yield price LC
All resignations Avg. Change 0.258 0.326 -0.303
N 41 44 44
p-value 0.099 0.031 0.044
Irregular resignation Avg. Change 0.461 0.259 -0.382
N 32 34 34
p-value 0.009 0.131 0.026
Regular resignation Avg. Change -0.475 0.551 -0.036
N 9 10 10
p-value 0.154 0.081 0.909
Anticipated resignation Avg. Change -0.876 0.330 0.036
N 7 7 7
p-value 0.020 0.338 0.924
Unanticipated resignation Avg. Change 0.144 0.624 -0.299
N 13 16 16
p-value 0.604 0.013 0.232
All appointments Avg. Change 3.036 -0.318 0.732
N 20 21 21
p-value 0.000 0.145 0.001
Appointment of insider Avg. Change 8.068 -0.335 0.493
N 8 9 9
p-value 0.000 0.315 0.139
Appointment of outsider Avg. Change -0.430 -0.350 1.078
N 10 10 10
p-value 0.174 0.319 0.001
US based education Avg. Change 6.880 -0.459 1.105
N 9 10 10
p-value 0.000 0.147 0.000
No US based education Avg. Change -0.119 -0.175 0.462
N 9 9 9
p-value 0.721 0.600 0.166
Note: The table evaluates whether the mean change of our variables of interest (¢y) over
the sample period, normalized by subtracting oﬀ the average change over the 90 days pre-
ceding the announcement and dividing by its estimated standard deviation ¾ over the same
period of time, equals their mean change on the event days. We test whether the average
change in our normalized dependent variables signiﬁcantly diﬀers from zero on days where
the replacement of a governor is announced.
21decrease stock prices (by almost 4 percent).
Turning to appointments of new governors, the results substantially deviate from
those reported in Table 1. The results show that new appointments lead - on average
- to a depreciation of the exchange rate and an increase in stock prices, while bond
spreads are not aﬀected. Distinguishing appointments of insiders from those without
a history in the central bank shows that the appointment of an insider leads to a
depreciation of the exchange rate, at the one percent level of signiﬁcance. This result
can be interpreted in light of Adolph (2004), who ﬁnds that central bank governors
who have been former central bank oﬃcials are associated with higher inﬂation than,
for instance, former private bankers.
As Table 1 also shows, appointing an outsider does, to the contrary, not sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect the exchange rate. Moreover, the appointment of a central bank
governor with US- or UK-based education increases stock prices, at the one percent
level of signiﬁcance. Surprisingly, however, the appointment of central bank gover-
nors educated in the US also depreciates the exchange rate. This might be due to
the fact that especially Latin American governments - well-known for their lack of
central bank independence - picked US trained economists to run their central banks
over the sample period.
The results of the Fisher test - aggregating the p-values of the test statistics
for the individual events - are reported in Table 3. As outlined above, we do not
put much faith in them, but merely report them to make our results comparable
with Kuttner and Posen (2007). To some extent, the results are again in line with
those reported previously. To summarize the broad picture, resignations only seem
to aﬀect the exchange rate. Irregular resignations depreciate the exchange rate at
the one percent level of signiﬁcance, and so do unanticipated ones. However, at the
ﬁve percent level, regular resignations also aﬀect the exchange rate. Unanticipated
resignations aﬀect stock prices. Of all 41 exits in our exchange rate sample, 14 lead
to signiﬁcant market reactions, at least at the ten percent level of signiﬁcance. 5
resignations aﬀect bond spreads; 8 have a signiﬁcant impact on stock markets.
Regarding the appointment of new governors, bond spreads and stock yields
22Table 3: Joint signiﬁcance of market reaction to events
Exchange Bond Stock
Sample rate yield price LC
All resignations Chi2 stat. 169.04 74.92 98.7
N 41 44 44
p-value 0.000 0.839 0.204
Irregular resignation Chi2 stat. 138.61 52.14 81.36
N 32 34 34
p-value 0.000 0.923 0.128
Regular resignation Chi2 stat. 30.43 22.77 17.34
N 9 10 10
p-value 0.033 0.300 0.631
Anticipated resignation Chi2 stat. 20.28 11.52 11.85
N 7 7 7
p-value 0.122 0.645 0.618
Unanticipated resignation Chi2 stat. 63.99 30.33 48.00
N 13 16 16
p-value 0.000 0.551 0.034
All appointments Chi2 stat. 40.83 67.26 77.32
N 20 21 21
p-value 0.434 0.008 0.001
Appointment of insider Chi2 stat. 44.51 47.46 20.62
N 8 9 9
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.299
Appointment of outsider Chi2 stat. 20.14 18.90 56.34
N 10 10 10
p-value 0.449 0.528 0.000
US based education Chi2 stat. 40.61 48.17 60.81
N 9 10 10
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000
No US based education Chi2 stat. 23.80 18.19 16.15
N 9 9 9
p-value 0.162 0.443 0.582
Notes: Independent hypotheses are combined into a single test statistic, following
Fisher (1941). -2 times the log of a p-value follows the Â2
2 distribution, where the
sum of Â2
2 distributed variables follows the same distribution. Under the null
hypothesis ¡2
PN
i¡1 lnpi is distributed as Â2
2N, with pi being the p-values of the
individual tests.
23show - overall - signiﬁcant reactions. The appointment of new governors with US-
based education aﬀects all three markets at the one percent level of signiﬁcance. The
appointment of an insider aﬀects the exchange rate and bond spreads, while those
of an outsider only aﬀect stock market returns.
To summarize the broad picture, our results to some extent imply that rather
irregular, unanticipated events than anticipated, regular events aﬀect the markets.
This implies that it is the change per se that matters for markets’ reactions and
not the reaction of markets to the resignation of governors with particular charac-
teristics (as otherwise regular exits should also have clear eﬀects on the markets).
Overall, our hypotheses are supported by the data. Investors do react negatively to
central bank governor changes. However, while this negative reaction suggests that
market participants expect an increase in inﬂation after these irregular, unantici-
pated changes, the results are also in line with an alternative explanation. Arguably,
market reactions might well reﬂect a general increase in risk perception following a
change at the head of a central bank. However, our results show that stock mar-
kets react least to these changes. As stock markets are least likely to be aﬀected
by changes in expected inﬂation, but equally likely to be aﬀected by perceived in-
creases in risk more generally, we take this as evidence in favour of the importance
of expectations about inﬂation. We return to this below.
Regarding the individual characteristics of incoming central bank governors,
there is no systematic pattern among our various analyses. We also distinguished
between dependent and independent central banks according to the deﬁnition in
Arnone et al. (2007) but obtained no signiﬁcant results.
Table 4 reports the results of the panel data analysis. As can be seen from column
1, stock market returns decrease at the one percent level of signiﬁcance with increas-
ing market uncertainty, as measured by an increase in the volatility index (VIX) of
the Chicago Board Options Exchange. Also at the one percent level, market returns
rise with higher 10-year US Treasury bond yields. 3-month US Treasury bill yields,
to the contrary, do not aﬀect stock markets at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. In


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25introduced by the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error
term. We therefore instrument the (highly signiﬁcant) lagged endogenous variable
with its second lag (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). Our results are not changed by this.
Column 3 shows the results for the exchange rate. The currency depreciates with
greater volatility and increasing 10-year yields, while changes in 3-month yields
again have no signiﬁcant eﬀect. The lagged dependent variable also is completely
insigniﬁcant (and we therefore do not instrument it).
Results for bond spreads, ﬁnally, are reported in columns 4 and 5. Signiﬁcant
at the one percent level, spreads rise with higher volatility, and lower 10-year and
3-month yields. The lagged dependent variable is also signiﬁcant at the one percent
level according to the OLS speciﬁcation of column 4 (with a negative coeﬃcient),
but is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels once instrumented (column 5).
Turning to our variables of interest, Table 4 again shows that ﬁnancial markets
do react to the resignation of central bankers. They also show, however, that the
appointment of a banker has no signiﬁcant impact. Speciﬁcally, our results show
that domestic stock markets react negatively to central bank turnovers. The esti-
mated coeﬃcients imply a small decline in returns of about 0.5 percent according
to the IV regression, on average.23 Arguably, while far from being a dramatic crash
of markets, this becomes economically important when we consider stock market
returns in US dollar. Hence, for the international investor base - proxied by the US
dollar denominated MSCI index - the combined decline in domestic stock and for-
eign exchange markets amounts to about 1.6 percent.24 Comparing these results to
those of Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) for the impact of changes in sovereign rat-
ings, for example, shows that the magnitude of announcing a central bank governor
change is about ﬁve times higher than those of announcing a change in sovereign
ratings. Column 3 shows that the resignation of a central banker leads to a depreci-
23Note that these results are based on a sample excluding periods of ﬁxed exchange rates and
data without daily availability. While the omission does not qualitatively aﬀect our results, the
coeﬃcient increases marginally.
24These point coeﬃcients are based on an estimation, where the dependent variable is the MSCI
stock market index denominated in US dollar.
26ation of the exchange rate, at the one percent level of signiﬁcance.25 The estimated
coeﬃcient implies a depreciation of almost 1 percent following the resignation of a
central banker. Columns 5 and 6, ﬁnally, show that bond spreads do not increase
following the resignation of the head of the central bank according to the OLS re-
gressions, but do increase (at the one percent level of signiﬁcance) once taking the
potential endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable into account. According to
the coeﬃcient, the resignation of a central bank governor increases bond spreads by
more than 1.5 percent. To put the result on resignations into perspective, Kaminsky
and Schmukler (2002) ﬁnd an average eﬀect of announcing a change in a country’s
sovereign rating on sovereign bond spreads that is about half of the eﬀect we ﬁnd
for announcing the change of a central bank governor. Interestingly, the announce-
ment eﬀects triggered by changing the minister of ﬁnance and economics (Moser,
2006) are comparable to those resulting from changing the central bank governor.
These ﬁndings support Santiso (2003), stating that policy makers in charge of the
central bank, ministry of ﬁnance and economics are equally key in interacting with
international ﬁnancial markets.
Tables 5 to 7 investigate the issue in more detail. In Table 5, we distinguish reg-
ular from irregular resignations, by including the interaction of irregular turnovers
with all turnovers. Table 6 seeks to control for changes in perceived conservatism
and Table 7, ﬁnally, separates the sample according to the respective country’s de-
gree of central bank independence. Arguably, changes in central bank independence
are more likely to be an issue in countries with low independence, while in coun-
tries with completely independent central banks personal characteristics are more
likely to be important. Our deﬁnition of central bank independence follows Arnone
et al. (2007), based on the method proposed in Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukier-
man (1992). These indices assess the political and economic independence of central
banks based on legal criteria. We use the median of their average overall values
over the late 1980-2003. As can be seen from Table 5, irregular turnovers lead to a
depreciation of the exchange rate, while the exchange rate appreciates by a small



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28margin following regular turnovers (at the one and ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance,
respectively). Assuming that personal characteristics of governors are on average the
same across regular and irregular turnovers, the currency depreciation triggered by
irregular events points to the importance of perceived central bank independence.
More importantly, we do not ﬁnd an announcement eﬀect of resignations on the
domestic stock or international bond market at conventional signiﬁcance levels. If
market reactions to irregular events were due to general market uncertainty rather
than changing perceptions of central bank independence, we would expect such neg-
ative market reactions on all three markets. Instead, we ﬁnd them exclusively for
the inﬂation sensitive foreign exchange market. The results are thus more in line
with the hypothesis that irregular resignations send a negative signal about central
bank independence to foreign exchange market participants.
Table 6 tests for the impact of changes in the central bank governor’s "conserva-
tiveness." We therefore included an interaction term between RESIGNi;t¤IRREGi;t
and a dummy variable that takes the value one when the nominating government’s
partisanship has changed from the previous one (PARTISANi;t). Clearly, if our
hypothesis that perceived central bank independence matters is correct, we will ex-
pect that our ¯2-coeﬃcient - proxying for perceived central bank independence -
remains signiﬁcant once we explicitly control for the second dimension of the inﬂa-
tionary bias, namely changes in conservatism. While our results indeed conﬁrm that
investors are worried about central bank independence, the additional interaction
term does not turn out signiﬁcant. Hence, we do not ﬁnd an independent eﬀect for
conservatism in the case of irregular resignations. All other results shown in Table
5 remain.
In Table 7 we separate the samples according to independent and dependent cen-
tral banks (omitting the OLS regressions for the bond and stock markets).26 As can
be seen, the results do not substantially diﬀer across the two samples. Irregular res-
ignations of the central bank governor go along with a depreciation of the exchange
rate, while there is no signiﬁcant impact on stock and bond markets. The eﬀect of













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31resignations on exchange rates is quantitatively more pronounced in countries with
greater central bank independence. In these countries, an irregular resignation leads
to a depreciation of more than two percent, almost twice as high as the correspond-
ing depreciation in countries with below median central bank independence. This is
intuitive. If the central bank depends on politics in the ﬁrst place, irregular resig-
nations are less likely to change market perceptions about its independence. With
banks that show some degree of independence, irregular changes are more likely to
aﬀect perceptions. We take this as additional evidence in favor of our argument that
personal characteristics of the central banker are less important than changes in
perceived independence.
Table 8 separately investigates anticipated and unanticipated resignations, while
Table 9 focuses on the appointment of insiders/outsiders and governors with/without
Table 8: Financial markets and (un)anticipated governor changes,
20 countries, 1992-2006
(1) (2) (3)
MSCI LC FX EMBI
IV IV
¢ log y, lagged 0.170*** 0.024 0.576***
(3.07) (0.53) (14.25)
CB Resignation -0.005** 0.013*** 0.012***
(2.51) (3.23) (4.08)
CB Resignation (anticipated) 0.003 -0.018*** 0.018
(0.35) (3.49) (1.22)
CB Appointment 0.013 -0.007 -0.009
(1.30) (0.72) (0.83)
¢ log Volatility Index (VIX) -0.056*** 0.005** 0.080***
(4.88) (2.62) (5.44)
¢ log US T-bond 10 years 0.049** 0.018* -0.930***
(2.81) (1.98) (3.92)
¢ log US T-bill 3 months 0.020 -0.004 -0.205**
(1.14) (0.78) (2.22)
Observations 51422 51423 51375
R-squared 0.03 0.004 —
The dependent variable is the (log) change in y. Results are based on clustered
robust standard errors. Figures in parentheses are t-values. Week-day eﬀects and
a constant are estimated but not reported. The instrumental variable (IV) estimation
in columns (1) and (3) uses a second lag of the dependent variable as an instrument.
Testing for ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in the error term via "areg" indicates no
ﬁrst order correlation.
***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, 10% level of signiﬁcance.
32US based education. Due to the small number of observations involved in some cases,
the results have to be interpreted with caution. According to Table 8, anticipated
governor changes reduce the impact of changes on the exchange rate. In fact, the
appreciation caused by anticipated changes slightly exceeds the depreciation follow-
ing the change in general. In line with the results reported above, the impact of
anticipated resignations is small, but signiﬁcant. As argued above, this eﬀect might
arise from a perceived change in conservatism, as half of the anticipated events also
involve a change in the partisanship of the nominating government. Overall, the
results again show that it is the unanticipated changes driving the negative result
on the exchange rate.
Turning to individual characteristics of central bank governors, Table 9 shows
that none of the additional interaction terms are signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
We conclude that personal characteristics of central bank governors do not matter
for market reactions.
In summary, our results show that ﬁnancial markets do react to central bank
governor changes. This negative eﬀect is mainly driven by irregular, unanticipated
events. Market participants are sensitive to signals about perceived central bank
independence, expecting higher inﬂationary bias. This claim holds particularly true
for the foreign exchange market, which is the market most prone to inﬂation concerns
in our study. On the other hand, it does not come as a surprise that the overall
picture for investors in domestic stock and international bond markets is more mixed,
since these markets are (at most) indirectly aﬀected by inﬂation expectations. Still,
these market participants may demand higher risk premia due to negative policy
signals from the incumbent government. The governor’s degree of conservatism, to
the contrary, does not seem to matter for market reactions, and the same is true for


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Central bank governor changes in emerging markets may convey important signals
about future monetary policy. Based on a new daily data set, this paper has exam-
ined the reactions of foreign exchange markets, domestic stock market indices and
sovereign bond spreads to the announcement of a central bank governor change.
The sample comprises all emerging markets with reliable data for all three ﬁnancial
market indicators, covering 20 emerging economies over the period 1992-2006.
Our results show, ﬁrst, that the resignation of a central bank governor negatively
aﬀects ﬁnancial markets on the announcement day, with average market reactions
between 0.5 to 1.5 percent. While these eﬀects are economically relevant and rela-
tively large in comparison to announcement eﬀects known from changes in sovereign
risk ratings, we ﬁnd less evidence that appointments of new governors incorporate
relevant news for investors. Second, comparing our results to the previous literature,
we ﬁnd that our results for emerging market economies are distinct from industri-
alized countries in an interesting aspect. Newly appointed central bank governors
apparently suﬀer from a systematic credibility problem at the beginning of their
tenure. In contrast to their counterparts in industrialized countries, emerging market
governors initially have to face (at least) a transitory rise in inﬂation expectations
because investors are uncertain about the true type of the central bank governor
("hawkish" vs. "dovish"). Third, the negative announcement eﬀect for resignations
is mainly driven by irregular changes, i.e. changes occurring before the scheduled
end of tenure. We oﬀer two interpretations. First, foreign exchange market partici-
pants are apparently sensitive to signals about perceived central bank independence,
expecting higher inﬂationary bias. This also holds true, when we explicitly control
for perceived changes in conservatism. Second, more generally, investors in domestic
stock and international bond markets may simply demand higher risk premia due
to negative policy signals from the incumbent government.27 As we ﬁnd negative
announcement eﬀects exclusively for the inﬂation sensitive foreign exchange market,
however, our results are more in line with the hypothesis that irregular resignations
27Turnovers might e.g. signal problems that were not recognized before.
35send a negative signal about central bank independence to foreign exchange market
participants. The governor’s degree of conservatism does not seem to matter for
market reactions. Finally, there is little evidence that personal characteristics of the
central banker matter for market reactions.
Overall, our study complements the view of Santiso (2003) that key policy mak-
ers in emerging markets are crucial for building credibility in international ﬁnancial
markets in one important aspect. Investors are apparently sensitive to the way an in-
cumbent government handles the replacement of key policy makers. With respect to
central bank governor changes, investors seem to care most about perceived central
bank independence. As this study focused on announcement eﬀects, we do not know
whether and to what extent such news aﬀect the markets beyond the announcement
day. We leave this question for future research.
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39A Appendix
Appendix 1: Number of central bank governor changes by country
Number of central bank governor changes by country
Country Number events Country Number events
Argentina 6 (3) Pakistan 1 (1)
Brazil 9 (2) Peru 4 (3)
Chile 1 (1) Philippines 2 (1)
China 1 (0) Poland 1 (2)
Colombia 1 (0) Russia 2 (1)
Egypt 2 (1) South Africa 0 (1)
Hungary 1 (1) South Korea 2 (0)
Malaysia 2 (1) Thailand 2 (0)
Mexico 1 (0) Turkey 2 (2)
Morocco 1 (0) Venezuela 3 (1)
Note: This table reports the number of central bank governor resignations
(appointments) over the period 1992-2006.
Appendix 2: Data availability
EMBI(G), FX to US Dollar and MSCI available
Country Start End Country Start End
Argentina 30.04.1993 31.07.2006 Pakistan 29.06.2001 10.08.2006
Brazil 15.01.1992 01.08.2006 Peru 30.05.1997 11.08.2006
Chile 28.05.1999 02.08.2006 Philippines 31.12.1991 12.08.2006
China 31.12.1997 03.08.2006 Poland 31.12.1997 13.08.2006
Colombia 31.12.1997 04.08.2006 Russia 31.12.1997 14.08.2006
Egypt 31.07.2001 05.08.2006 South Africa 31.12.1997 15.08.2006
Hungary 29.01.1999 06.08.2006 South Korea 31.12.1997 16.08.2006
Malaysia 31.12.1997 07.08.2006 Thailand 31.12.1997 17.08.2006
Mexico 31.12.1991 08.08.2006 Turkey 31.12.1997 18.08.2006
Morocco 31.12.1997 09.08.2006 Venezuela 31.12.1992 19.08.2006
Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(log) spread 5.68 1.07 0.00 8.88
(log) MSCI 5.53 1.06 2.55 8.61
(log) exchange rate 3.09 -2.44 7.82 8.00
Central banker change 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
(log) VIX 2.91 0.32 2.23 3.90
(log) US T-bond 10 years 1.94 0.22 1.41 2.35
(log) US T-bill 3 months 1.62 0.42 0.59 2.31
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